Rule 68 Offers of Judgment:
The practices and opinions of experienced civil rights
and employment discrimination attorneys
By Hosch Professor Thomas A. Eaton and Mercer University School of Law’s George Professor Harold S. Lewis Jr.

Editor’s Note: This is an abridged version of an article that will be published in a forthcoming issue of Federal Rules Decisions.

s structured
by Rule 68 of
the Federal
Rules
of
Civil Procedure, offers
of judgment are intended to encourage settlement but are widely
thought to be ineffective in doing so. The
primary explanation for this impotence is
that Rule 68 does not provide enough of
a carrot or stick to move the parties to the
prompt resolution of their dispute.
In broad terms, offers of judgment impose
a price on one party’s refusal to accept a reasonable offer. Under the text of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 68, that price is a forfeiture of the relatively modest “costs” described
by 28 U.S.C. § 19201 that would otherwise
be recoverable by a prevailing party, as well as
payment of the defendant’s post-offer costs
of the same kind.
Significantly, the costs put in play by the
bare text of Rule 68 do not include attorneys’
fees and in most cases will even in the aggregate be so modest that they will not create
a significant incentive for a defendant to
make, or a plaintiff to be fearful of rejecting,
an offer of judgment.
In light of the weak incentives, it is not
surprising that Rule 68 has played only a
minor role in federal civil litigation since its
enactment in 1937.
There are, however, certain classes of
claims in which Rule 68 has the potential to
be a much greater influence on dispute resolution – claims under statutes that include
attorneys’ fees as part of recoverable costs.
In its 1985 opinion in Marek v. Chesny2,
the Supreme Court melded the Rule 68
4
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term “costs” with the phrase “fees as part of
the costs” that appears in 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
which codifies the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act of 1976. That statute authorizes awards of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs who
prevail in claims brought under certain civil
rights statutes, as well as to the rare prevailing
defendant that can demonstrate a plaintiff’s
claim was frivolous or without foundation.
Under Marek, a plaintiff who rejects a
Rule 68 offer and prevails at trial for an
amount not exceeding the offer forfeits not
only the modest costs discussed above but
also all post-offer attorneys’ fees that a prevailing civil rights plaintiff would otherwise
receive by virtue of a federal statute.
While a significant number of federal feeshifting statutes do not employ the “fees as
part of costs” language upon which Marek
relied, the great bulk of contemporary federal question litigation is founded on statutes
that do award fees as part of costs.
Notably, this latter group includes litigation under most civil rights legislation,3 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 and
a significant number of environmental statutes.
At the time

Marek was decided, many commentators
feared Rule 68 would give civil rights defendants so much leverage that Rule 68 offers
would effectively coerce premature and
unfair settlements.
Specifically, it was speculated that defendants would routinely make early, low-ball
offers of judgment; plaintiffs, fearful of forfeiting what is often the largest part of their
recovery (attorneys’ fees), would feel compelled to accept many such offers without
having had the opportunity to conduct
sufficient discovery to evaluate with care
the probability and magnitude of success;
and the federal policies underlying these
fee-authorization statutes would be seriously
undermined as a result.
For the most part, however, it appears
that these concerns did not materialize. In
the two decades following Marek,
there have been only occasional
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reported decisions construing Rule 68.
In addition, anecdotal reports from both
plaintiff and defense counsels whose practices are devoted to employment discrimination and civil rights confirm the rarity of
Rule 68 offers.
Despite the widespread belief that Rule 68
has had little practical effect on civil litigation, there is a resurgence of interest in offers
of judgment. States, including Georgia, have
enacted new offers of judgment statutes, or
modified existing ones, as part of civil litigation reform efforts.5
Academic literature abounds with doctrinal, theoretical, experimental and empirical scholarship that explores how offers of
judgment statutes might be more effective
in achieving the goal of bringing about the
faster, less costly resolution of federal civil
litigation without undue sacrifice of fairness
to parties.
We were interested in learning why Rule
68 is not a more prominent feature of civil
rights and employment discrimination litigation. Why is it not used more frequently in
the very types of cases in which defendants
have the greatest economic incentive
to make offers and plaintiffs have
the most to lose if they refuse
them?
Our interest in Rule 68
is not driven by the
belief that

too many cases go to trial. Indeed, it appears
the civil trial has become a notable rarity
– by one respected account, more than 98
percent of federal civil litigation is resolved
by means other than trials.6
Nevertheless, Rule 68 may harbor the
potential to speed up the settlement process
and thereby produce significant economic
savings to the parties, with correlative savings to the courts and the taxpayers who
fund them.
Our contribution to the policy discussion is to report the views of experienced
practicing attorneys who decide on a daily
basis whether to make or accept offers of
judgment.
We conducted in-person, in-depth interviews with 64 experienced litigators who
prosecute and defend civil rights and employment discrimination claims. This is the first
such nationwide empirical inquiry into the
incidence of practitioner use of Rule 68 in
the federal fee-authorization cases where,
after Marek, one would expect its use to be
most common.
We interviewed cohorts of four
attorneys in each of 16
cities. Each

cohort consisted of attorneys who represent
civil rights plaintiffs, civil rights defendants,
employment discrimination plaintiffs and
employment discrimination defendants.
Collectively the 64 lawyers we interviewed
had more than 1,600 years of practice experience. The least experienced attorney we
interviewed had been practicing in the area
for 10 years; the most senior lawyer had been
in practice for more than 40 years; and the
average level of experience in our pool was
more than 25 years. Our 64 lawyers collectively had worked on more than 13,000
employment discrimination or civil rights
cases during the last five years. Assured
of confidentiality, they were also extremely
candid, occasionally even confessing matters
that reflected less than nobly on their competence or professionalism.

With some exception, Rule 68
offers are rarely made in federal
civil rights and employment discrimination cases
The first research question we explored
was whether the anecdotes were true: is Rule
68 largely ignored? Our interviews confirmed that in federal districts throughout
the United States, Rule 68 offers of judgment are rarely used in either employment
discrimination or civil rights cases.
A New York City employment discrimination plaintiff attorney who had been in
practice for 33 years reported he had received
three offers in his practice experience – one
every 11 years.
An employment discrimination
defense lawyer in New Orleans said
he had made 10-15 offers in 30
years of practice. That works
out to one offer made every
two or three years.
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A Chicago employment defense lawyer Why aren’t more Rule 68 offers
concerned about adverse publicity.
said he had not made any Rule 68 offers in of judgment made in civil rights
Some lawyers were concerned about more
the past five years.
specific adverse consequences. For example,
and employment discrimination
An in-house corporate counsel, who cases?
we were told by several civil rights defense
supervises employment discrimination cases
There is no single answer to this question. lawyers that a police officer who has a judgfor one Fortune 500 company, said his client However, several themes recurred through- ment entered against him individually would
had not made an offer of judgment during out the interviews. A few of the more promi- have more difficulty securing a mortgage and
the past decade.
face difficulties in career advancement.
nent themes include the following:
On the civil rights side, one
Lawyers for public defendefense lawyer stated he had
dants, and to a lesser extent
made no more than 10 offers
private defendants, also
over a 30-year career in which
expressed a need to back up
he and his firm have processed
their team: “we’re not going
10,000 cases on behalf of the
to make offers of judgment
The most frequently voiced explanation
state’s largest city and various
because it makes it look like
sheriff’s departments.
we’re not backing our police
for why Rule 68
Civil rights defense attorofficers,” or “we need to supneys in Memphis and
port the police” or “we need
Houston, who between them
to support the supervisors in
is not used more often
had more than 40 years of
our company, especially when
experience, had never made a
we do not think that they did
is that there are problems associated with
Rule 68 offer.
anything wrong.”
These stories tend to conThe term “judgment” was
the word “judgment.”
firm the conventional wisdom
viewed by many attorneys as
regarding the infrequent use
an admission that the alleged
of Rule 68.
wrongdoing had occurred,
… Judgments are more formal public
While the general rule is
while a “settlement” could be
one of non-use or very infreexplained on grounds other
declarations of wrongdoing.
quent use, there were some
than the merits.
notable exceptions.
2. W hy make a Rule 68
– Hosch Professor Tom Eaton and
Civil rights defense lawyers
offer when we are conGeorge Professor Harold Lewis
in New York City, Minneapolis,
fident that we will ultiPhiladelphia, Oakland and
mately win the case?
the greater Seattle area report
Many
defense counthey now consider whether
sels
explained
they do not
to make a Rule 68 offer as
make
frequent
use of Rule
a routine part of initial case
68
because
they
are
confident
evaluations.
they
will
prevail
on
the
merits,
often
at the
1.
Problems
with
the
term
“judgment”
A civil rights defense lawyer in the Pacific
summary
judgment
stage.
The
most
frequently
voiced
explanation
Northwest reported he has made Rule 68
On its face, Rule 68 triggers a sanction
offers in 70 percent of his cases. No one for why Rule 68 is not used more often is that
only
when the plaintiff receives a judgment
there
are
problems
associated
with
the
word
else we interviewed came even close to that
for
less
than the amount of the offer. Thus,
“judgment.”
figure.
it
provides
no specific tangible reward to a
Privately
negotiated
settlements
typically
All the reports of systematic use of Rule
defendant
for
having made an offer if the
include
non-admission
of
liability
clauses
and
68 came from lawyers practicing civil rights
defendant
then
wins the case outright on
confidentiality
provisions.
Judgments
are
more
defense, not employment discrimination
7
the
merits.
formal
public
declarations
of
wrongdoing.
defense. Thus, the lawyers reporting the
Interestingly, some employment discrimiMany defense lawyers reported their cligreatest use of Rule 68 all represented public
nation
defense lawyers who do not make
ents,
both
public
and
private,
want
to
avoid
– not private – defendants.
Rule
68
offers in federal court said they do
making
this
formal
declaration
of
wrongdoEven in cities in which civil rights defenmake
offers
under corresponding state rules
ing.
dants make Rule 68 offers with some frewhere
the
state
rules allow their clients to
Some
defense
counsels
explained
their
quency, we found no evidence of similar use
recover
attorneys’
fees from the plaintiff.
clients
would
not
want
to
make
a
public
of Rule 68 in employment discrimination
Thus,
there
appears
to be some merit to
declaration
of
wrongdoing
because
doing
so
cases, where most defendants are private
the
proposition
that
if
court rules hold out
might
encourage
others
to
sue.
companies.
Other lawyers reported their clients were to defendants the prospect of not just relief
6
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from paying a plaintiff’s fees, but an affirmative award for their own fees, they might
make more Rule 68 offers.
3. “Not a penny for tribute”
The reluctance to make a Rule 68 offer
may be part of a broader, hardball litigation
strategy.
Several defense lawyers commented their
clients would rather pay thousands for
defense and “not a penny for tribute.” This
suggests that clients would rather pay more
money litigating than it would take to
resolve the dispute under Rule 68.
Why would that be so? Discouraging
the filing of other claims, avoiding adverse
publicity, and supporting government and
corporate officials whose actions are being
challenged may all play a part.
One civil rights defense lawyer expressed
the “not a penny for tribute” sentiment in
terms of morality, saying that it was “just
wrong” to spend a dollar of taxpayer money
to pay a non-legally deserving plaintiff. That,
in his view, is a misuse of public funds.
Of course a defendant adopting this stance
may be just as averse to a privately negotiated
settlement as to a resolution under Rule 68.
4. Economic conflict of interests
The fourth common theme is the specter
of economic conflict between the defendant
and defense counsel.
Since the primary leverage Rule 68 provides is the forfeiture of plaintiffs’ post-offer
attorneys’ fees, the offer is more effective if
made early in the litigation.
If a Rule 68 offer is made closer to trial
(e.g., after the denial of a defense motion for
summary judgment), a lesser amount of the
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees is at risk after the
offer is rejected.
Most defense lawyers are paid on the basis
of an hourly fee. There is a widespread suspicion among plaintiff lawyers that one reason
more Rule 68 offers are not made early in
the litigation is that defense lawyers wish
to accrue a certain amount of fees before
encouraging their clients to settle.
Most but not all of the plaintiff lawyers we
interviewed subscribed to the belief that economic conflict between defendants and their
lawyers partially accounts for the apparent
underutilization of Rule 68.
Of course, no defense lawyer admitted to
running up his own fees, but some acknowlSpring/Summer 2007
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edged that there might be others who do.
Other defense lawyers expressed strong
disagreement, even outrage, at this suggestion. They pointed out that market forces
push them towards efficient resolution of
disputes. Competition among the defense
bar for clients is such that a lawyer who pads
his hours will soon find his client represented
by another attorney.
And even in single engagement cases
where counsel does not expect to represent
the client in future matters, there is often an
insurance company that is paying the cost
of defense.
The economic conflict theory is also called
into question by the fact that many salaried
government attorneys who do not stand to
gain financially by increasing the number
of hours devoted to resolving a dispute,
nevertheless, also fail to recommend Rule
68 offers.
On the other hand, the only lawyers we
found who did make Rule 68 offers with any
degree of frequency were those representing
public defendants. And they did so despite
the bureaucratic obstacles of gaining settlement authority reported by some of those
lawyers.
To some extent this finding may support
the assumption that there is economic conflict between private, hourly paid defense
lawyers and their clients.
5. Problems with placing a value on a
claim early in the litigation
A few defense lawyers said they cannot
accurately evaluate a case sufficiently early in
the litigation to make Rule 68 an attractive
inducement to resolve the dispute.
One defense lawyer claimed he needed 18
months of discovery before he could ethically evaluate what a case was worth.
This problem is compounded by defense
uncertainty regarding the amount of plaintiff pre-offer attorneys’ fees.
The current Rule makes the amount of
those fees critical to calculating whether a
plaintiff’s ultimate judgment exceeds the
defendant’s offer, yet it does not require a
plaintiff to disclose those fees to facilitate
fully informed offers.
Very few of our interviewees deemed
ordinary case valuation to be a significant
problem.
Plaintiff and defense lawyers in both civil
rights and employment discrimination prac-

tices overwhelmingly agreed a defense lawyer
can value a case in terms of liability and
damages fairly early on in the litigation
– generally within four to six months after
the action commences.
Further, most defense lawyers thought
they could either estimate the plaintiff’s preoffer fees by considering what the defense
fees were at that point in the case; or by
evaluating how well they thought the plaintiff was prepared at that stage; or simply by
asking the plaintiff’s counsel directly for this
information.
However, several defense lawyers expressed
the view that plaintiffs’ fees often do not
correspond to defense fees and that plaintiff
counsels generally refuse to provide this
information when requested.

Attorneys’ reactions to reform
proposals
Soften terminology from “judgment” to
“settlement/agreement”
The first proposal was simply a terminology change. Instead of an offer of “judgment,” amend the Rule 68 to authorize
an offer of “settlement” or “agreement” or
“compromise,” the language used in rules in
several states.
In a similar vein, we inquired about having the Rule expressly authorize the defendant to include in the offer a nonadmission
of liability clause, which some of our lawyers considered logically inconsistent with a
“judgment.”
There was almost universal support among
our plaintiff and defense lawyer respondents
for softening the Rule’s terminology from
offer of “judgment” to offer of “settlement”
or “agreement.”
All who expressed a view on the issue
agreed the change had the potential to
increase defendants’ use of the Rule.
A small number of plaintiff lawyers
opposed altering the terminology fearing
that an increased use of Rule 68 would do
their clients more harm (e.g., low-ball offers
that might coerce early resolution) than good
(earlier payment of a reasonable sum).
Others expressed concern that the term
“settlement” undermined the public vindication of the plaintiff and condemnation of the
defendant implicit in the latter’s confession
of a “judgment.”
Advocate
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Fundamentally reformulating the Rule
to be two-way, so plaintiffs as well as
defendants could initiate the offer process
Although several states, including Georgia,
empower plaintiffs to make Rule 68 offers,
the current Federal Rule allows only defendants to do so.
Initially we asked the lawyers about their
general attitude, without getting into the
details, about allowing plaintiffs, as well as
defendants, to initiate the offer.
That is, for the first time, federal court
plaintiffs would have the option of submitting an offer (really, a demand) of judgment
or settlement that would put defendants at
risk for some sanction, probably a fee multiplier, beyond the damages and fee liability
defendants currently incur if they are found
liable in an action under a federal fee-recovery statute.
Plaintiff counsels overwhelmingly and
strongly supported this change.
If the Rule were made two-way, they said,
plaintiffs would use it early and routinely as a
way of dynamiting earlier offers out of recalcitrant defendants, particularly those whose
liability was backed by an insurer.
Plaintiff counsels further speculated that
defendants would likely respond with their
own early counter-offers of judgment.
Plaintiff lawyers also asserted that a plaintiff’s offer (demand) followed by a defendant’s offer would establish a more reasonable range for settlement at an earlier time
in the litigation than in ordinary settlement
negotiations.
This assertion was premised on the belief
that Rule 68 offers are of potential value to
offerors only if they represent predictions of
trial outcomes that are credible to offerees.
Many defense counsels were strongly
opposed to empowering plaintiffs to make a
Rule 68 offer, although a significant number
were either moderately or strongly supportive. We should not, however, underestimate
the intensity of the opposition on the part of
many defense lawyers.
In general, they reasoned that defendants
who lost at trial were already liable to pay
100 percent of the plaintiffs’ fees and that
any additional sanction was excessive. Or
they pointed out that defendants who make
offers and plaintiffs who make demands
are not similarly situated, in that offers are
8
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underwritten by a defendant’s real resources
while demands cost plaintiffs nothing.
A summary of attorneys’ reactions to
two-way reform proposals
We presented the attorneys with a number
of specific proposals.
These had two primary variables: the sanction imposed on the party rejecting the Rule
68 offer and defining when the sanction
would be triggered.
Determining the appropriate sanction is
quite tricky.
Clearly, the current Rule 68 sanctions
do not induce civil rights and employment
discrimination defendants to make many
Rule 68 offers.
What sort of additional sanctions might
prompt defendants to make more Rule 68
offers (e.g., requiring plaintiffs who did not
improve on the offer at trial to pay some
multiple of defendants’ costs or even defendants’ post-offer attorneys’ fees)?
On the other hand, given that civil rights
and employment discrimination plaintiffs
who prevail at trial already are awarded attorneys’ fees, what additional sanction might be
awarded to a plaintiff when a defendant who
rejects the plaintiff’s Rule 68 offer and does
not improve on the offer at trial (e.g., an
enhancement of attorneys’ fees)? And what
circumstances would trigger these sanctions?
One set of proposals suggested creating
additional “pressure” by requiring the offeree
to beat the offer by a certain percentage
(say, 15 or 25 percent) to avoid a sanction.
Other proposals incorporated a “cushion” by
denying sanctions if the outcome at trial fell
within some specified percentage of the offer
(again, say, 15 or 25 percent).
None of the specific proposals received
uniform support.
Yet opposition to particular proposals may
have obscured somewhat greater support by
both plaintiff and defense lawyers for the general concept of some kind of two-way rule.
More than a few lawyers who objected
to specific details of a proposed model nevertheless embraced the broad suppositions
underlying a two-way Rule 68.
These suppositions are that defense lawyers who might not now counsel their clients
to consider the Rule would routinely and
quickly do so if their clients were to receive a
plaintiff’s offer of judgment (demand) under

a two-way regime.
There would then be two offers (really an
offer and a demand) on the table. If each
was made thoughtfully, those offers might
be pegged at a somewhat more realistic
level than the customarily extreme initial
demands and responses in standard positional bargaining.
This is because the benefits under the Rule
for a plaintiff offeror would not be triggered
unless she could beat her own offer after trial
by at least a penny, or perhaps by a modest
percentage; and the benefits for a defendant
offeror would not be triggered if the plaintiff
could exceed or come close to that offer
within the same margins.
Further, those somewhat more realistic
demands and offers would presumably be
made earlier than the opening salvos in ordinary private settlement negotiations.
Unlike the defendant, who has sole control
over initiation of Rule 68 today, the plaintiff
and plaintiff’s lawyer are typically desirous of
resolving litigation and being compensated
as soon as possible. They, therefore, have
every incentive to consider making a Rule
68 offer quickly.
Finally, the Rule’s 10-day deadline for
acceptance or rejection of an offer/demand,
often 30 days in state practice, might result
in both sides focusing on settlement and,
mindful of probable trial outcomes, doing so
earlier than in ordinary bargaining uninfluenced by the Rule.
Several respondents offered an opinion
about whether this “realism” dynamic is
implicit in a two-way rule and would speed
the pace of settlements.
Civil rights plaintiff lawyers told us, at
least in theory, a two-way rule would lead to
earlier resolutions and would not have any
more negative effects on their clients than
the current Rule.
Civil rights defense lawyers responded
more diversely on the general utility of a
two-way rule. Some opined it would not
have much effect because plaintiffs’ typical
demands are (and implicitly would remain)
outrageous.
Others agreed that a two-way approach
would elicit early, more reasonable plaintiff
demands and would encourage earlier resolution of conflicts by providing pressure well
before trial is imminent.
The most widespread enthusiasm for a
Spring/Summer 2007
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two-way rule was found among our plaintiff
employment discrimination lawyers.
The degree of support for a two-way rule
among those lawyers was somewhat surprising given the view held by many that the
threat of increased costs sanctions on their
clients might well deter the initiation or continued prosecution of viable claims.
Few employment discrimination defense
counsels – the lawyer group probably most
threatened economically by the successful
use of the Rule – opined on a two-way rule,
but most who did were, perhaps surprisingly, somewhat supportive, at least in the
abstract.		

circumstances, that both sides view as sufficient to induce the parties to make early
offers, but not so great as to unfairly coerce
parties to forego their legitimate rights to
pursue and defend civil rights and employment discrimination claims.
Striking this balance in a way that both
plaintiff and defense attorneys deem palatable should prove to be quite difficult.
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 arc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials
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and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1257
(2005) (in 2003, only 1.7 percent of civil terminations
occurred during or after federal trial); Marc Galanter,
A World Without Trials, 2006 J. Disp. Res. 7
(in 1962, federal civil trials accounted
for 11.5 percent of case terminations;
in 2004, civil trials made up 1.7
percent of terminations).

Dilemmas for the
amendment process
History suggests that would-be reformers
of Rule 68 should approach the task with
considerable caution.
Prior efforts to modify Federal Rule 68
have failed, and the prospects for success
depend importantly on securing a consensus from both sides of
the bar.
The core challenge is
to devise a set of sanctions, triggered under
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